By Susan P. Mattern
How did the Romans construct and retain some of the most strong and strong empires within the background of the area? This illuminating publication attracts at the literature, particularly the historiography, composed via the participants of the elite who performed Roman overseas affairs. From this proof, Susan P. Mattern reevaluates the roots, motivations, and targets of Roman imperial overseas coverage particularly as that coverage with regards to battle. In a big reinterpretation of the resources, Rome and the Enemy indicates that techniques of nationwide honor, fierce pageant for prestige, and revenge drove Roman international coverage, and although assorted from the hugely rationalizing recommendations usually attributed to the Romans, dictated styles of reaction that remained constant over centuries.
Mattern reconstructs the realm view of the Roman decision-makers, the emperors, and the elite from which they drew their advisers. She discusses Roman conceptions of geography, procedure, economics, and the effect of conventional Roman values at the behavior of army campaigns. She indicates that those leaders have been extra strongly motivated by way of a conventional, stereotyped belief of the enemy and a force to avenge insults to their nationwide honor than through thoughts of defensible borders. actually, the need to implement a picture of Roman strength was once an incredible coverage objective in the back of lots of their such a lot brutal and competitive campaigns.
Rome and the Enemy offers a desirable inspect the Roman brain as well as a compelling reexamination of Roman conceptions of war and nationwide honor. The ensuing photo creates a brand new figuring out of Rome's lengthy mastery of the Mediterranean international.
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Additional info for Rome and the enemy : imperial strategy in the principate
Joseph. 124; Millar 1982, 8 –9. 115 Tiberius orders Vitellius to declare war after receiving a letter from Herod the tetrarch that his army had been attacked and destroyed by the Nabataean king Aretas. 35. Tac. Ann. 19; Cass. 4 –5. 36. Tac. Ann. 25; see Cass. 3 on Corbulo’s treaty. 37. Eckstein 1987, xiii. 38. Cass. 4: “kai; oJ Traiano;~ di∆ eJautou` kai; au\qi~, ajll∆ ouj di∆ eJtevrwn strathgw`n, to;n pro;~ ejkei`non povlemon ejpoihvsato” (and Trajan once again waged the war on him [Decebalus] himself, and not through other commanders).
If this strategy is not easy to trace on a map, that does not necessarily mean it was incoherent, “irrational,” or ineffective. The system I have briefly outlined could dictate specific responses to specific situations, which remained consistent over a long period of time. And the Romans, unlike some modern nations, knew when they had won or lost a war. While the Romans emerge from this study as relatively aggressive in their foreign policy, I would also like to suggest that “aggression” and “defense”—though the latter forms a convenient subheading for the third chapter, on strategy—are ultimately inadequate to describe Roman foreign relations.
50. 8. 20, with Walbank 1957–1979, vol. 2, ad loc. 51. On Aratus, see recently A. M. Lewis 1992; cf. Walbank 1957–1979, vol. 7– 11; on Republican education, see Marrou 1956, 229 –254; and note the discussion of Harris 1979, 14 –15. Cato the Elder’s education of his son is described by Plut. Cat. Mai. 20, and see Bonner 1977, 10 –11. , 77–79). On Hellenization, see Rawson 1985, chap. 11, and recently Gruen 1993. 52. On what was taught in Roman secondary schools (by the grammaticus), see Bonner 1977, chap.